Analytics
EUREN Brief 8
T
The State of the European Security Order
and the Role of Institutions – A European View
The European security order and its
institutions (NATO, EU, OSCE) have come under massive attack in recent years. Russia's annexation of
Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing political, economic and military support of the pro-Russian
separatists in eastern Ukraine have led to a profound rift between Russia and the states of the
European Union, as well as the United States of America. The ongoing conflict illustrates how the
Kremlin no longer accepts the basic principles of the European security order. Established after
1990, these principles were recognized in the Charter of Paris and subsequent treaties by both
sides. While Russia no longer feels bound by these rules and wants to renegotiate the European
security order, the Europeans do not want to accept or legitimize Moscow's geopolitical claims and
adhere to the existing basic principles.
Jana Puglierin
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin
September 2019
Surrounded by conflicts – instead of
friends
However, Vladimir Putin's revisionist foreign
policy is not the only challenge there is to the European security order today. Within just a few
years, the European security landscape has changed radically. Back in 2003, when the EU published
its first European Security Strategy, its authors still assumed a "secure Europe in a better world".
"Never before," they said, "has Europe been so prosperous, so secure and so free." Back then, the
Europeans saw themselves as being surrounded by friends and thought that the EU was an export model.
The wars in the former Yugoslavia were over and NATO had peacefully expanded eastwards. In the
shadow of the peace dividend and the American security guarantee for Europe, many European states
generously cut their defence budgets, outsourced their defence to the United States and adapted to a
world where conflicts were peacefully solved through negotiations and diplomacy.
Sixteen
years later and not much remains from this supposed "end of history". Instead, the EU now must adapt
to things it thought would never happen. Today, Europeans find themselves in a world dominated by
the return of nationalism and power politics, with a revisionist Russia, a rising and ever-more
vigorous China, and a United States that promotes a policy of "America First". For the first time in
post-war history, an American president is not only calling into question the unconditional security
guarantee for the European continent but also being openly sceptical of, if not hostile to, the EU
as an institution.
Not much remains from this supposed "end of
history". Instead, the EU now must adapt to things it thought would never happen
This puts the EU's foreign policy model, based
on international institutions, multilateralism and the rules-based international order, increasingly
under pressure. Over the past decade, the EU's efforts to project stability and democracy outward
has collapsed, as its immediate neighbourhood has transformed from a circle of potential friends and
partners into a ring of fire, exporting instability to the EU. Twenty years after the end of the
Yugoslavian wars, the Western Balkans are still politically fragile, while wars, conflicts and the
collapse of state structures are shaking large parts of Africa and the Middle East.
Not modifying but forcefully defending
the existing order
In this context, marked by an eroding security
landscape and the questioning of such fundamental principles as the territorial integrity or
inviolability of borders, Europeans see the preservation of the status quo and the maintenance of
existing rules, principles and institutions as being existential to their security – if not to their
very existence. Further erosion of the European security order is therefore not to be answered by
revising ordering structures, but by forcefully defending the existing ones. An attack on the
multilateral world order cannot be averted by weakening or abolishing the institutions that support
it. Europeans simply do not want to fall back into those dark times when European security was
determined by zones of influence and the balance of power politics.
Although the Kremlin
claims that the existing security order has forced Russia to live under a Western dictate, it was
exactly this order that allowed the EU to prosper and live in unprecedented peace and prosperity.
While Vladimir Putin perceives European security institutions, mostly NATO, as being instruments to
oppress Russia, Europeans considered them to be linchpins of the European security order. From their
perspective, NATO and the EU have proved extremely useful for guaranteeing stability and lasting
peace in Europe and have also helped tremendously to facilitate the peaceful transformation of
Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Enlarging both institutions and
including former members of the Warsaw Pact has prevented a zone of instability and insecurity from
developing in the heart of Europe. It has also massively increased the security of former frontline
states like Germany.
An attack on the multilateral world order cannot
be averted by weakening or abolishing the institutions that support it. Europeans simply do not
want to fall back into those dark times when European security was determined by zones of
influence and the balance of power politics
Furthermore, the enlargement of NATO and the EU
is seen as legitimate because it has satisfied the security needs of states that suffered decades of
Soviet domination. For those states, Russia's ever-more aggressive foreign policy represents the
greatest threat to their national security. Consequently, while NATO focused on out of area missions
for the decade after 9/11, the annexation of Crimea has put the territorial defence of Europe back
on top of NATO's agenda.
NATO remains fundamental – despite the
odds
To this day, NATO remains the key pillar of
European defence and the European security order, President Trump's repeated criticism of European
Allies and the Alliance's value to US security notwithstanding. For Europeans, NATO provides the
framework for a continued US presence in Europe, which is considered to be vital for European
security and stability. Militarily, the US remains the EU's most important ally. The Europeans would
be unable to replace the US's military capabilities, even in the medium term. Any attempt to cut
loose would immediately undermine European security – and split the Europeans, because cracks in
transatlantic relations are also always intra-European cracks.
On the other hand, many
Europeans have realized that they can no longer expect the US to take the lion's share of the
defence burden in Europe and its periphery. Instead, Europeans need to contribute more to protect
the European security order and take more responsibility. Donald Trump is not the first president to
convey the message that Europeans need to increase their defence spending, but he is by far the most
vigorous. He makes the Europeans feel the negative consequences of their dependence on America.
To this day, NATO remains the key pillar of
European defence. Any attempt to cut loose would immediately undermine European security – and
split the Europeans, because cracks in transatlantic relations are also always intra-European
cracks
With America pulling back and expecting more
from its allies, a more capable, active, and sovereign EU in security, trade, and global diplomacy
is no longer a "nice to have," but a question of survival. Many EU member states are increasingly
realizing that if they want to assert themselves in the face of new geopolitical realities, the EU
must become a stronger and more capable defence actor that is no longer primarily a civilian power.
With the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation (Pesco) and the European Defence Fund,
Paris and Berlin have succeeded in laying the foundations for a stronger role of the EU within the
European security order. However, these structures have still to be filled with life and nobody in
the EU considers them as an alternative to NATO, but rather as a means to expand the EU's footprint
in the alliance with the Americans in the long term.
The goal of EU defence initiatives is
not the territorial defence of the Union. Their aim instead is crisis management in Europe's
periphery. Many EU member states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, want to avoid even the
slightest suspicion that the EU wants to duplicate NATO. They continue to see the USA as the most
important and irreplaceable guarantor of their security, which they do not want to alienate under
any circumstances. Consequently, the EU aims to further improve the inter-institutional relationship
with NATO. Both institutions already work successfully together to create the legal, logistical and
infrastructure conditions to enable rapid military movement to, across and from Europe.
Europeans have no intention of turning away from the US in order to gain "strategic autonomy"
vis-a-vis their closest ally. In fact, even if the EU was to move much faster and more vigorously
with the creation of a European "defence union", it would not become independent from the US in the
foreseeable future. Instead, Europeans gradually want to put themselves in a position to protect the
EU and stabilize its own neighbourhood in case of a crisis, especially if the US is unwilling to
become engaged. At the same time, the existence of a more capable EU is considered to enhance the
attractiveness of Europeans as American allies.
Erosion of arms control
Given the fundamental differences that exist
between Russia and the West, it is clear that NATO will remain at the heart of the conflict. There
is little hope that the NATO-Russia Council can significantly contribute to easing the tensions.
Nevertheless, channels of communication must be maintained. At the moment, the Normandy format and
the OSCE are best suited to serve as platforms for continued dialogue. However, the parties to the
conflict are too far apart, and there is insufficient consensus for an inclusive pan-European
security order. Since it will not be possible to bridge the existing conflict in the foreseeable
future, it can only be a matter of limiting the resulting damage. Here, the Normandy format and the
OSCE can provide valuable support, as they are the only platforms where dialogue with Russia is
still possible.
Since it will not be possible to bridge the
existing conflict in the foreseeable future, it can only be a matter of limiting the resulting
damage. Here, the Normandy format and the OSCE can provide valuable support, as they are the
only platforms where dialogue with Russia is still possible