Analytics
EUREN Brief 6
A
EU-Russia relations and security in the
Baltic Sea region: relative stability in the shadow of deep-rooted divisions
Although not free from tensions, the Baltic
Sea region is a relatively stable subregion in the broader European security landscape. There are no
unresolved conflicts in the region, and the likelihood of a military conflict is broadly regarded as
low. Yet, the turning point of EU-Russian, and more broadly Western-Russian relations that followed
Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014, has weakened the security environment in the Baltic Sea
region in many ways.
Kristi Raik
Estonian Foreign Policy Institute of the International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn
Estonian Foreign Policy Institute of the International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn
September 2019
Back to bi-polarity
During the Cold War era, the Baltic Sea region
was split by the Iron Curtain. The dividing line was blown up, but only to a certain degree, by the
collapse of the Soviet system. The post-Cold War attempts to integrate Europe's East and West (or
rather, the East into the West) shifted the borders of the EU and NATO next to Russia. At the same
time, the EU's and Russia's political systems and views on European security remained too different
to be integrated. A flurry of regional cooperation initiatives emerged in the 1990s, but did not
bridge the differences.
Since the late 2000s, and especially after 2014, these differences
have been growing again. Splitting the Baltic Sea region, the dividing line between Russia and the
rest has become more pertinent again. Once again, the region is divided into two poles with
distinctly different political systems, democratic versus authoritarian, and conflicting approaches
to European security order. Unlike during the Cold War era, the dividing line now goes between
Russia and the rest of the Baltic Sea states, whereas Moscow has no satellites or annexed countries
in the Baltic Sea region.
The Nordic-Baltic security landscape remains fragmented when it
comes to the basic security policy choices of countries in the region,[1]
notably Finland and Sweden. Both used to be neutral states during the Cold War, but have become
closely engaged in developing the EU's security and defence policy, while staying outside NATO.
Unlike during the Cold War era, the dividing line
now goes between Russia and the rest of the Baltic Sea states, whereas Moscow has no satellites
or annexed countries in the Baltic Sea region
At the same time, Russia's actions against
Ukraine and increased military activity in and near the Baltic Sea region have pushed other
countries in the region, especially the smaller ones, closer together in their threat perceptions
and views on regional security. Coordination and cooperation among the Nordic and Baltic countries
in the field of security and defence have intensified, both in the frameworks of the EU and NATO and
in various bi- and minilateral groupings. The EU's unity vis à vis Russia is considered to be vital
by the Nordic and Baltic states.
More than ever before, regional security and the
implications of Russia's actions in Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere for the Baltic Sea region have
become key topics at the foreign and defence ministers' meetings of Nordic (N5) and Nordic-Baltic
(NB8) countries.[2]
Cooperation in the framework of NORDEFCO – an overarching structure for Nordic defence cooperation,
established in 2009 – has intensified, and now also involves, to some extent, the Baltic states.[3]
The most notable change, however, has occurred in bilateral defence cooperation between Finland and
Sweden. In 2014, enhanced cooperation was initially limited to peacetime activities, but it then
shifted in 2015 to cooperation "without political predeterminations", including the possibility of
potentially undertaking combined Finnish-Swedish territorial defence operations.[4]
Russia's actions against Ukraine and increased
military activity in and near the Baltic Sea region have pushed other countries in the region,
especially the smaller ones, closer together in their threat perceptions and views on regional
security
The Nordic and Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation
is complementary to the various levels of engagement of these countries with NATO and the EU. The
increased presence of NATO in the region has been welcomed, not only by the Baltic states and
Poland, but also (less vocally) the militarily non-aligned Finland and Sweden. The latter have
intensified their cooperation with NATO as much as possible, while stopping short of membership.[5] For
instance, the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, launched in 2015. This initially involved the
Nordic-Baltic NATO members, plus the Netherlands, before Sweden and Finland joined the group in
2017.
The Russian side has repeatedly condemned the increased presence of NATO in the
Baltic States and Poland and the deepening cooperation of Finland and Sweden with the Alliance as
reasons for the worsening security situation and Russia's increased military activity in the region.
Such comments were most recently made by the defence minister Sergey Shoigu as a warning signal
right before President Vladimir Putin met with his Finnish counterpart Sauli Niinistö in Helsinki.[6] From
the perspective of the other Baltic Sea states, however, the cause-effect relationship works in the
opposite direction. In light of Russia's aim to prevent further enlargement of NATO to Sweden and
Finland, its actions have appeared to be rather counterproductive.
Growing role of the EU in regional
security
The strength of institutions and norms remains a
critical issue for smaller countries in the Baltic Sea region, as well as Germany. Two norms deserve
to be highlighted in the post-Crimea context: the right of countries to choose their own foreign and
security policy orientation (highlighted, for instance, by Finland and Sweden, as they contemplate
their choices), and the unacceptability of changing borders by the use of force. The lack of a
shared commitment to these norms, together with violations by Russia, inevitably make Russia's
smaller neighbours feel more insecure. The erosion of the norms and multilateral structures of
European security that involve Russia, such as the OSCE and mechanisms of arms control, enhances the
importance of military deterrence and defence.
Many of the underlying assumptions of the
EU's approach to Russia, as developed in the post-Cold War period, have proven unrealistic or
unhelpful. The earlier attempts (with their roots going all the way back to German Ostpolitik in the
1970s) to support economic ties, sectoral cooperation and Russia's modernization as a way of
enhancing stability and security failed to produce the expected results during the 2000s and 2010s.
The prioritization of economic cooperation over security considerations, which is a traditional EU
approach, was never embraced by the Russian side. The EU side had practically abandoned its
expectations regarding Russia's transformation before 2014. Yet, old concepts about economic
cooperation, modernisation and transformation lurk in the background of EU policy and have not been
replaced by new, more realistic ideas. EU-Russia interdependencies, which used to be a key element
in the EU's approach to building win-win relations and stability, no longer appear in as positive a
light as before. Both the EU and Russia have become increasingly concerned about reducing the
vulnerabilities that come with mutual dependencies; for instance, the EU's vulnerability in the
energy sector and Russia's in the financial and technological sectors.[7]
Both the EU and Russia have become increasingly
concerned about reducing the vulnerabilities that come with mutual dependencies; for instance,
the EU's vulnerability in the energy sector and Russia's in the financial and technological
sectors
As a direct consequence of Russia's actions in
Ukraine in 2014, the EU is placing new emphasis on strengthening its resilience and countering
hybrid threats.[8]
The Nordic-Baltic member states have been proactive in this field.For instance, in 2017 Finland
established the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which is endorsed by
both the EU and NATO and now brings together more than 20 member states, including members of both
organisations. By conducting research, training and exercises, the Centre seeks to improve shared
situational awareness and the exchange of best practices. Estonia has focused on its flagship area
of cybersecurity, where it held a first-ever strategic table-top exercise called EU CYBRID in the
framework of Estonia's presidency of the Council of the EU in 2017.
Furthermore, defence
cooperation in the EU framework has taken a major leap forward. The EU is not to take responsibility
for territorial defence, which remains the core task of NATO, but has started to contribute to
member states' defence capabilities in new ways.[9]
The most important project for regional security, pursued under the EU's Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO) on defence, is the project on military mobility, pursued in cooperation with
NATO.[10]
Hence, the EU's contribution to regional security has seen some increase, even though it remains
limited and mostly indirect.
Some ways to manage
tensions
In the current context, the deeper sources of
EU-Russian tensions – most notably the lack of a shared understanding about the European security
order – are unlikely to be dissolved any time soon. Thus, the main practical short-term question is
how to manage tensions and keep them under control. Some points for consideration in this regard:
- Strong Euro-Atlantic institutions and their strong presence in the Baltic Sea region may
be portrayed in negative terms by Moscow, but they constitute an important element for enhancing
stability and predictability. The increase of tensions in the transatlantic relationship during
Donald Trump's presidency has so far had no tangible negative implications in the Baltic Sea region,
but it does increase uncertainty.
- Dialogue between the EU and Russia, and between EU
member states and Russia, is needed, but should not be fetishized. The reason for the increasing
tensions was not a lack of dialogue, and more dialogue will not, in itself, solve the fundamental
disagreements. That said, talking to each other as a way to have a better understanding of the
perceptions and intentions of the other side is a basic tool to manage tensions. Among (and, to some
extent, within) the Nordic-Baltic countries, there are considerable differences as to how dialogue
with Russia is viewed. A shared more pragmatic approach to maintaining contact with the Russian side
would do no harm. This should not, however, include re-engaging Russia in multilateral institutional
frameworks, from which it was excluded in 2014, without preconditions.
The EU has to downscale its expectations, since
Russia's actions have proved that while economic losses have contained military escalation, they
have not stopped Russia from pursuing its geopolitical interests, and (more fundamentally) have
not made Russia redefine its interests.