Analytics
EUREN Brief 4
T
European institutions and the European
security order:
an essay on American perspectives and their implications
an essay on American perspectives and their implications
The US and transatlantic relations are an
essential part of the European security order. However, attitudes and policies in the US are in
flux. The transitional nature of US approaches needs to be taken into account when we are discussing
European security today (see also
EUREN Chronicle 1, February 2017).
The absence of any single American perspective
on Europe is not new. But the reality of many perspectives has become especially clear since Donald
Trump's inauguration as the US President. Here, I offer a quick look at two prevalent, competing
narratives that I think are particularly important and, consequently, offer some conclusions about
how US policy is likely to evolve in the future. I then marry this up with some core questions about
European security, asking what it would take to build a more sustainable European security order.
September 2019
American perspectives
I characterize the first American perspective as
a "traditional" perspective. Although what I present here is simplified, I think it accurately
reflects the viewpoints shared by many in the so-called Washington foreign policy elite, whatever
their party affiliation is or position on the liberal-conservative spectrum. This is a perspective
rooted in the notion that the current European security order, the one comprising NATO, the EU, and
a substantial US security role, is useful and effective. This worldview holds that American
contributions to European security have helped to end centuries of conflict on the continent and
remain valuable today. The transatlantic security relationship also makes it possible to bring
European capabilities (and European infrastructure) to the table when the US needs them, and to
provide a certain European imprimatur to US military actions around the world.
This
security relationship also underpins European institutions, while the expansion of those
institutions and ways of doing business beyond their member states (or to new member states)
provides more stability and security to NATO, EU countries and their partners. Indeed, many
proponents of the "traditional" view might argue that a "liberal" global order, based on written and
unwritten rules, but understood by all and followed by most, has grown from this European order and
made the world a better place. The potential decline or collapse of this order would be extremely
dangerous to Europe, America, and the world.
A few additional precepts flow from those
already listed. Two are longstanding: First, NATO is the United States' primary, most important
alliance. Second, the evolution and growth of the EU has been a positive development, even if EU
bureaucracy is sometimes frustrating to navigate. Views on Russia, however, have shifted in recent
years. A decade or so ago, most of this community would have argued that Russia needed to be better
integrated into Western institutions. Today, they are more likely to say that Russia is threatening
those institutions and, indeed, Western states themselves. Containing Russia has thus become an
important policy goal. However, most "traditionalists" agree that some amount of cooperation with
Russia is still necessary, particularly in the area of arms control, and many now argue that China
is the bigger threat.
The "traditional" American perspective is rooted
in the notion that the current European security order, the one comprising NATO, the EU, and a
substantial US security role, is useful and effective
Aspects of this traditionalist perspective can
be found in the foreign policies of George H.W. Bush, William Jefferson Clinton, George W. Bush and
Barack Obama, to list just the American Presidents who have held office between the end of the Cold
War and 2017. It underpins the viewpoints of neoconservatives on the right and liberal
internationalists on the left. It is not, however, the narrative on Europe that emerges from
statements and actions of the current American presidential administration.
The policy
stance of the administration in office today is not always internally consistent (which is not to
say that the "traditional" view is), but a few general themes are evident. First, we have heard,
including from the top, intimations that NATO may have outlived its usefulness, and has fostered a
European security order in which America provides the security and Europe enjoys it. Those who feel
this way are particularly frustrated because they see the EU as an economic competitor to the US. At
the very least, they argue that America needs to spend less money on European security, although
they probably agree it should maintain a robust presence in the region and have unfettered access to
it. They might prefer this to be arranged on a bilateral basis with friendly countries, thus
avoiding inconvenient negotiations with those who would limit American power. The current
administration is also skeptical about arms control, and tends to view it as an unnecessary
constraint on American capabilities.
Now we have heard, including from the top,
intimations that NATO may have outlived its usefulness, and has fostered a European security
order in which America provides the security and Europe enjoys it
Russia splits the administration. Many in the US
government today, if forced to choose an adversary, would prefer China for a host of reasons beyond
the scope of this essay. That said, a number of influential figures look at Russian behavior and see
it as a challenge to US interests and goals. The President himself, meanwhile, continues to hope for
a better relationship.
I often hear in Europe, and elsewhere, that this current approach is
an aberration, and will go away as soon as Donald Trump leaves office, and America is brought back
to the "traditional" approach. Leaving aside the question of when that might happen, I often point
out that Donald Trump is the third president in a row to have come to office promising to limit
America's global commitments. For all the lip service to "traditional" views, and all the
"traditional" advisors in the halls of power, the perspective has never fully held sway. Past
American presidents may have believed in Europe, but they also complained about the division of
financial labor between the US and its NATO allies. The inclination to see China as an adversary is
a perennial in US foreign policy, as is a less pervasive but still consistent trend since the end of
the Cold War to identify Russia as a threat. So the "new" perspective, while different from the
"traditional" one, is less of a departure from past policies than some may paint it.
The idea that we can go back to a better, safer
time conveniently puts aside the reality that countries wanted to join NATO because they feel
threatened by Russia, and still want to join for the same reason. The bottom line is that the
old order was not as secure, or as orderly, as we may have wished it to be
Moreover, at least on the point of a less
globally engaged America, the current US presidential campaign further suggests that this trend
won't simply reverse itself when Donald Trump's tenure comes to an end. The Democratic Party's top
candidates are far more focused on domestic politics than foreign policy. This is not unusual –
American voters rarely base their decisions on foreign policy. It is, however, especially pronounced
in this campaign. In addition, most of the candidates, with the exception perhaps of the former Vice
President Joseph Biden, appear to be more personally interested in the domestic agenda. Combined
with the very many challenges that indeed face the country and war-weariness on the part of the
population, it seems highly likely that if one of them becomes President, they will make the home
front their priority.
However, even if "traditionalism" were to prevail in US policy, I'm
not sure that the actions it would call for are as sustainable as their proponents might hope. The
notion of a global liberal order, and the European order within it, has always been a bit flawed. It
ignores transnational threats. It mischaracterizes America's wars(which have not always been in line
with that order), and its efforts, successful and less so, to gain European support for them. It
ignores the challenges of migration and the fact that so many growing economies, not least that of
the United States, are only growing for a small proportion of the population — and shrinking for the
rest. It ignores that not all economies are growing. There are reasons that populist and nationalist
parties are on the rise. Russia, even if it has ties to some of them and is seen as a model in
others, is not among those reasons. Nor is China.
Nostalgia for the European order that was
(even if it wasn't as orderly as it is now remembered) also ignores the fact that Russia never felt
secure about it. One can argue at length about why, but this fact is difficult to contest. Russia's
greater global activism today means that its interests cannot be ignored or dismissed as invalid.
Conversely, the idea that we can go back to a better, safer time conveniently puts aside the reality
that countries wanted to join NATO because they feel threatened by Russia, and still want to join
for the same reason. The bottom line is that the old order was not as secure, or as orderly, as we
may have wished it to be.
Towards a more sustainable European
security order?
So what new order is now emerging? During the
10th EUREN meeting, participants have debated whether it makes sense to speak of "taking sides" in
Europe (see EUREN Chronicle 7, September 2019). The "sides" in question are binary choices, between
Russia on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other. If there are no sides, everyone exists in a
common Europe (and environs), where good relations with Russia are compatible with strong ties with
the EU. If there are sides, countries must make choices – Russia, the so-called "West," or some kind
of neutrality. Countries that feel threatened by Russia, including some of its neighbors, hope that
their allies and partners will, in fact, take their side. Countries that do not feel threatened may
discount those perspectives, and seek ways to support friends and allies that do not aggravate a
split with Moscow. They may also not want sides to be taken, for they do not want political conflict
to turn into military conflict. The dangers of nuclear escalation mean that the costs of large-scale
war in Europe today are even higher than they were in the first half of the 20thcentury,
when two world wars devastated the continent.
Russia's own policies, however, seem to
suggest that it does not mind the idea of a binary split in Europe, despite the risks. The country's
history, including its recent history, has led it to seek security by promoting its own power and
influence. If the choices are binary, and Russia is one of those choices, then its power and
influence are cemented. If, however, everyone exists in a common Europe, Russia's interests and
perspectives may be more easily overruled.
Thus, those who fear Russia want guarantees that
allies and partners may not be able to give. Russia, for its part, remains nervous about those
partners and allies, even if they don't support the countries that seek their help. A less involved
US complicates the equation further. If the US doesn't put itself at the center of European
security, then far more work will fall to the states of the region. The new challenge for Europe,
then, is to find a path to security despite substantial disagreement on what the threats are and
uncertainty as to what the role of the US is.
The new challenge for Europe, then, is to find a
path to security despite substantial disagreement on what the threats are and uncertainty as to
what the role of the US is