The COVID-19 pandemic, the political crisis in Belarus, and the Navalny incident have made 2020 the most complicated year in EU-Russia relations since 2014. The EU-Russia Expert Network on Foreign Policy (EUREN) spent time this year reflecting upon "Alternative futures of EU-Russia relations in 2030". We also encouraged our members to share their views on present developments. This EUREN Brief is part of a series about the question "EU-Russia relations – what now?". See also the contributions by Timofey Bordachev, David Cadier, Sabine Fischer, Tatiana Romanova, Hanna Smith, Ivan Timofeev, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz.

n the course of the past decade Russia's relations with the West in general, and the European Union in particular, have produced widespread frustration. [1] For some that was an inevitable outcome of the actors' diverging core interests, for others a lamentable mishap on the road to a better future. While studying past developments and mistakes can offer valuable food for thought, we are where we are, and will have to move on from here. In order to help understand the prospects of the troubled EU-Russia relationship, this paper will categorise various policy proposals in three groups: those that are impossible to achieve, those being implemented already, and those that could potentially be tested in the coming years.

Sergey Utkin
Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences

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December 2020

What is not going to happen

While the EU-Russia relationship has been deteriorating for years, a number of bold legacy initiatives survive, making the situation look better than it actually is, at least in official rhetoric. Politicians and diplomats use those initiatives to encourage hope, as a reminder that better alternatives are still possible – but groundless hope is counterproductive. One must remember, of course, that the word "never" is for good reason taboo in political analysis. But in the scope of the next ten years or so, certain once-trumpeted ambitions will have little or no chance.

The EU and Russia are not building the common spaces laid out in the 2005 "road maps". In fact, a significant number of EU member states, including those directly bordering Russia, see a hard divide between the EU and Russia as a core national interest. Russia, too, is ever less inclined to see some sort of convergence with EU rules, regulations and policies as a worthwhile goal. This does not mean that the broad spectrum of dialogue topics once included in the "road maps" is now irrelevant. Exchange of views and negotiations remain the high road to progress – but they will be more successful if the parties do not pretend they are still in the mood for "common spaces".

Neither the EU nor Russia (or rather, in this case, the Eurasian Economic Union) are ready to agree a mutually acceptable concept for a free trade area. Protectionist lobbies make free trade arrangements increasingly complicated even where the parties are not driven apart by political disagreements, as the EU and Russia certainly are.

Exchange of views and negotiations remain the high road to progress – but they will be more successful if the parties do not pretend they are still in the mood for "common spaces"

There will be no visa-free travel between the EU and Russia in the foreseeable future. Security concerns have grown significantly, and the respective state agencies in Europe are less inclined than ever to relinquish tools that help them track visits and regulate migration.

The foreign policy visions of the EU and Russia will remain strikingly separate, even on the most pressing issues. EU talking points will continue to include harsh criticisms of Russia's actions, and Russian officials will respond in kind. An EU-Russia Political and Security Committee, as proposed at the 2010 meeting between Medvedev and Merkel at Meseberg is off the table for now. And if is attempted it will fail.

Given the depth of disagreements on military matters, Russia will not make it onto the list of non-EU countries that contribute to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. Even bilateral military cooperation with EU members will remain very complicated or impossible.

Culture and education will probably remain the only areas where the ideal of a common space is implemented at least partially (and often independent of government efforts). But the existing hurdles will remain – in terms of recognition of qualifications, lack of funding and, again, security concerns fostering estrangement and paranoia.

Grand designs will not work. The EU will not be seduced by the Greater Eurasia concept. No new European Security Treaty will be signed. EU-Russia summits, criticised for inefficiency even when they were an established tradition, will not be restored. A broader process on the scale of 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is unlikely to occur, and if it does it will not help.

What is happening?

Making each other's life more difficult is not the core intention of the EU or Russia, even if it sometimes seems so. Each is pursuing its own policies to tackle challenges and exploit opportunities. Occasionally, decisions made independently by one can have a positive effect on both.

The EU and Russia may not be ready to eliminate trade tariffs but they both seem in the mood for trade facilitation. Queues of trucks at the borders, endless customs paperwork and complicated trade rules are not in any state's interest. These and similar issues are being addressed, even if progress is often slow. Border crossings have been modernised, roads improved, customs procedures digitalised. The EU and Russia may still have disagreements over the implementation of WTO rules, but both seem keen to keep the WTO mechanisms functioning. The COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a severe blow to economic activity, including trade, which is another reason to look for ways to speed up the subsequent rebound.

Making each other's life more difficult is not the core intention of the EU or Russia, even if it sometimes seems so

The pandemic also unprecedentedly reduced travel, including tourism, educational exchanges and business trips. The visa barriers were suddenly sidelined by travel bans imposed for public health reasons. However, the EU and Russia are still working to improve their outdated visa procedures, which could have a positive effect on travel in the longer run. For the EU that means the broad application of multiple-entry Schengen visas and the Smart Borders initiative, while Russia is to enlarge its e-visa scheme from 2021, allowing EU citizens to apply for and receive Russian short-stay visas online.

The EU and Russia disagree on many but not all foreign policy topics. The Iranian nuclear programme is an example where Russia and the EU have a lot in common, while the United States takes a different course. Areas of dispute also require dialogue, which is occurring at various levels between Russian diplomats and the European External Action Service.

Russian students and scholars participate in various joint educational and research projects involving EU universities and centres of excellence. This cooperation is increasingly vulnerable to fall-out from international and domestic political events, but there is still a chance to maintain and broaden the academic communication that is so vital for societies and scientific progress.

Like any other country working with the EU, Russia is fully aware of the importance of bilateral tracks. The EU remains a Union of twenty-seven states rather than a superstate. EU members' attitudes to Russia are not homogeneous, and bilateral cooperation with certain countries is generally successful, even if it is constrained by the EU consensus, especially concerning sanctions.

What could be done?

Among the issues on which Russia and the EU disagree strongly, one clearly stands out: the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Its dynamic is not determined by EU-Russia relations, but it does decisively affect them. In the unlikely event of the conflict moving towards resolution, new opportunities for the EU-Russia relationship could emerge. As it stands, the frozen conflict will leave little room to improve the EU-Russia status quo.

Russia's bilateral relations with a number of EU countries are not at the level they deserve. This sets a low ceiling for the relationship with the EU in general. While some see the root of the problem in "Russophobic attitudes" and others in Russia's own policies, it must be possible to address at least some of the concerns, initially through diplomatic backchannels. Toning down media campaigns while focusing on mutually beneficial economic and infrastructural connectivity could be a useful approach.

Among the issues on which Russia and the EU disagree strongly, one clearly stands out: the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Its dynamic is not determined by EU-Russia relations, but it does decisively affect them. As it stands, the frozen conflict will leave little room to improve the EU-Russia status quo

Even given the known political constraints, it is still unnatural for the EU not to have a regular dialogue with the Eurasian Economic Union similar to the communication it maintains with many other integration entities across the globe. This will not elevate the EU-Russia relationship to a whole new level but it could help to facilitate trade and clear regulatory bottlenecks.

Russia is developing growing interest in topics that might define the future environment for humankind – sustainable development, climate change, digitalisation, biotechnologies. These areas also form the heart of the EU's current and future agenda. There is an obvious need to debate and work on these issues together, engaging government agencies as well as business and research groups. These are vital fundamental matters that cannot be postponed until current political issues have been resolved.

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The EU-Russia relationship exists in a much larger context of global technological and political shifts. EU-Russia ties are stagnating while the world is moving on. Both the EU and Russia intend to remain competitive and retain global influence in the coming decades – each in their own way . Whether they will impede or facilitate each other's progress is still an open question. But mutual obstruction is likely to lead to mutual failure, and that, at the very least, should motivate the EU and Russia to look for ways to give cooperation another chance.

The content of this paper is the sole responsibility of the author and does not represent the position of individual EUREN members or EUREN as a group.

[1] For an overview of EU-Russia developments see for example: Tuomas Forsberg and Hiski Haukkala The European Union and Russia (Springer, 2016).