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EU-Russia Dialogue
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Moldova Has a New President. What Next?
resident Sandu's key imperative will be to
foster a functional majority in parliament that produces a reformist government. But the current
parliamentary configuration is not conducive to a major reforms push.
November 2020
Moldovan politics are traditionally a messy
affair, with twists and turns that may surprise even the most astute observers. Back in 2019, few
predicted the political downfall of Moldovan tycoon Vlad Plahotniuc or the formation of a governing
coalition between politically incompatible forces. In this regard, the presidential elections that
concluded last Sunday are no exception. Just like four years ago, the 2020 race saw Igor Dodon, a
practitioner of patronal politics, face off against Maia Sandu, a fervent reformer. While all
opinion polls put the incumbent Dodon in the lead, Sandu prevailed in the first round by a 3.5
percent margin. Instead of the expected close result in the runoff, Sandu triumphed by 15.5 percent.
This impressive win for Sandu and crushing defeat for Dodon deserve to be unpacked.
Electoral Slam Dunk
There are several factors that, taken
together, may explain this spectacular outcome.
The first is experience. Back in 2016,
Sandu was still in the middle of her transition from a successful technocrat to a politician of
national caliber. Dodon was also a technocrat, but made the transition to politics much earlier. In
terms of political games and communication, he had the edge. Sandu spoke like a project manager;
Dodon acted like a savvy populist. Sandu stayed away from toxic politicians; Dodon has been less
selective in choosing political allies to further his political ambitions. However, after a period
of political reconnaissance, Sandu learned how to talk and to practice political elbowing without
losing credibility. It was Sandu who pushed for a tactical coalition with Dodon in 2019 to dislodge
Plahotniuc, whose grip on Moldovan politics had become dangerously tight. At the same time, as prime
minister she did not cling to power at any cost. Sandu kept pushing for an anti-corruption agenda,
which was a no-go for Dodon who, after five months, decided to pull the plug on the alliance.
Overall, though not without bruises, Sandu emerged stronger and better prepared for a brutal
election campaign.
The second factor is party support. In 2016, Sandu's political project,
Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), was still in its infancy and short of funds, with few
territorial structures and facing constant harassment of its supporters by law enforcement bodies.
Dodon was backed by the formidable political machine of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of
Moldova (PSRM), which had cannibalized the local structures of the former hegemonic Communist Party
of Moldova. By 2020, PAS had become a veritable political force, too, with mayors, local councillors
(as a result of the 2019 local elections), and functional branches across the country. In terms of
infrastructure and resources, it remained vastly inferior to PSRM, but still, Sandu had much
stronger and better organized support on the ground than four years ago.
The third factor
is perception. The images of both candidates had undergone a dramatic shift in the four years since
the last election. Sandu managed to add to her unblemished integrity (a very rare quality in the
post-Soviet region) the gravitas of a stateswoman who has experience in managing the country and
representing it internationally. She was also able to rekindle hope among Moldovans: not an easy
task in a country where the population is chronically disappointed in its political class. Dodon's
image, meanwhile, rapidly sank. His unnecessarily numerous visits to Moscow created the impression
in the public opinion of a Russian puppet. The overdose of overt Russian support (and also covert
support exposed by media) backfired. Dodon's informal alliance with Plahotniuc came back to bite
him, too. A video of Dodon receiving a plastic bag allegedly containing money from the tycoon became
a viral meme and the source of multiple jokes. Kuliok (a plastic bag) became the president's
derogatory nickname, and it is probably the word of the year in Moldova. This was devastating for
Dodon's image and popular standing. On top of all this, the outgoing president had no major
achievements to show: only a mismanaged coronavirus epidemic and the looming economic storm.
The fourth factor is competition in the populists' camp. While in 2016 Dodon was
populist-in-chief of the pro-Russian flank, things changed dramatically when Renato Usatii, the
leader of Our Party (which was excluded from parliamentary elections in 2014), returned from Moscow.
With formidable communication skills, more refined populism wreathed in anti-corruption discourse,
and the simultaneous use of the Russian and Romanian languages, Usatii successfully chipped away at
support for Dodon. In the first round, Usatii got an impressive 16.9 percent; in the diaspora vote
he came first in Russia (Dodon's traditional turf) and second in Europe. This partially explains
Dodon's underperformance in the first round. In between the two rounds, Usatii used his growing
presence on social media to keep pounding Dodon. Ultimately, he called on his supporters to vote
against Dodon, and some of them did, contributing to Sandu's big win.
Last but certainly
not least — in fact, probably the most important factor — is the diaspora. Moldovans living abroad
vote overwhelmingly for pro-European parties and candidates. They also turn out in large numbers to
exercise their right to vote. In 2016, 67,000 members of the diaspora voted in the first round of
the election, followed by almost 139,000 in the second. The upward trend is therefore nothing new.
The first round in the 2020 election two weeks ago only confirmed this ascendant tendency, with
149,000 votes cast outside Moldova. This diaspora activism unnerved Dodon, who described Moldovans
living and working abroad as a parallel electorate whose agenda and preferences are in stark
dissonance with those living in Moldova. This description, voiced between the two rounds, caused an
uproar among the diaspora. Migrants sent home a sum equal to 16 percent of Moldova's GDP in 2019,
making the diaspora the biggest "foreign investor" in Moldova. Voters living abroad responded to the
president's remarks at the ballot boxes, and this proved fatal to Dodon's chances of reelection. In
the second round, 262,000 people voted abroad, and 92 percent of them chose Sandu, ensuring an
electoral slam dunk. This record participation by the diaspora offset the effect of organized voting
of (31,000) Moldovan nationals from the breakaway region of Transnistria, who voted overwhelmingly
for Dodon. The diaspora accounted for 16 percent of all voters in this election and became a force
to be reckoned with.
President Sandu
After Plahotniuc fled the country, Dodon
embarked on a power grab to preserve the old system of patronal governance. One pillar holding up
that system just collapsed, and it's fair to assume that a President Sandu will keep hammering to
take out the remaining ones.
Moldova is a semi-parliamentary republic in which the
president has limited yet not entirely symbolic powers. For example, according to the law, the
president coordinates the work of the intelligence services and presides over the Supreme Security
Council. Sandu can be expected to frame corruption as a national security threat and to try to use
the institutional power she has to galvanize the work of relevant structures in this field. The head
of state also appoints judges, and the newly elected president is likely to veto the appointment of
those who are suspected of corruption or do not meet high integrity standards (not the case under
Dodon). The president also nominates the prime minister, and according to a 2013 Constitutional
Court ruling, she may reject candidates (proposed by parliamentary factions) on the same grounds.
These are just a few examples of how Maia Sandu could wield her power to pierce the shield of the
patronal system.
The popular vote confers a high level of legitimacy to the president. It
is very likely that Sandu will exercise the right to address parliament to voice her opinion on
topics of major interest for society. Given the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic, she is likely to
advocate for a more vigorous and better organized response. Her background in economics will
encourage her to speak out more on issues of economic and social development, too. To put pressure
on the governing coalition, which is reluctant to carry out reforms, she may use the right to
introduce legislative initiatives.
The presidential campaign exacerbated the public
polarization, and Sandu will perhaps try to heal the divisions. During the electoral campaign, she
began addressing Russian-speaking minorities in the Russian language to try to dispel any fears they
might have regarding her candidacy. In the wake of her electoral win, she thanked Moldovans in
Russian as well as Romanian. As president, she might continue to use both languages to bridge the
existing divides and unite society around problems that affect all Moldovan nationals, regardless of
their ethnicity or spoken language.
The president enjoys important powers in the field of
foreign policy. The priority for Sandu will be to reopen the top-level dialogue with two key
neighbors (Ukraine and Romania) and reach out to the EU. In four years, President Dodon made no
state visits to Kyiv or Bucharest, while relations with Brussels were put on the back burner.
Moldova's neighbors largely ignored Dodon for his short-sighted declarations regarding Ukraine's
territorial integrity and hostile verbal attacks against Romania. The scope of interaction with the
EU was limited by Dodon's resistance to reforms.
The new head of state is likely to change
all that. For Moldova, it is an impermissible luxury to have frozen dialogue at the top level with
Romania, the country's single most important trading partner (over 25 percent of exports go there,
compared with 9 percent to Russia) and a vital player in terms of energy security. Ukraine too is
important for Moldovan trade, ecological security, and for Transnistria. The EU is and will remain
in the years to come Moldova's main export market and a partner for multidimensional development;
even more so as the economic effects of the pandemic increasingly become felt in Moldova.
If the epidemic allows, Brussels, Bucharest, and Kyiv will likely be the first capitals on the new
president's travel itinerary. Sandu may create a better atmosphere, improve communication, and
negotiate and conclude new accords, but if all these efforts are not followed up at a governmental
and parliamentary level, presidential diplomacy will render few palpable dividends. And this leads
to the incoming president's key imperative: to foster a functional majority in parliament that
produces a reformist government. But the current political configuration in parliament is not
conducive to a major reforms push.
Early Elections