The European states are gradually setting new
strategic goals, first and foremost preserving the independence of their foreign policy in the
changing global context. The period of external expansion finished when the European Union reached
most of Europe's natural borders. The calm reaction of key European powers to the internal political
crisis in Belarus derives not only from the absence of infrastructure on the ground or from an
understanding of Russia's determination. As quite a compact country, Belarus could theoretically
find a place in Europe. But despite massive discontent with Lukashenka's rule, it is unlikely that
Belarussians would be as unanimous in choosing the EU as Ukrainians seemed to be. The EU's response
to the events in Belarus in August and September 2020 was determined by the lack of internal backing
for further expansion, even if in the short term some EU members, like Poland, will work to
radicalize protests there.
Russia, for its part, has dropped ideas of rearranging the
European order to acquire a place commensurate to its power. Isolationist voices that emerged in the
Russian foreign policy debate during the pandemic are growing stronger amid fears that Russia could
be dragged into the growing conflict between China and the United States. Proposals to reduce
political contacts with Europe fell on open ears in Russia and were echoed by the Russian foreign
minister in September 2020. His statement was widely noted in the media, because Moscow
traditionally stood for the continuation of political dialogue in any conflict situation. In fact,
on the very day when Sergey Lavrov announced that communications with Europe might be put on hold,
one of his deputies held consultations with EU representatives in Brussels.
This sequence
of events gives grounds for hope that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European
Commission will maintain contacts and inform each other on the issues that require cooperation. At
the same time, in the next five to seven years we should not expect even a partial restoration of
the numerous working formats on specific interaction issues that were created under the 1997
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and other joint resolutions. The same obviously also applies
to the EU-Russia summits, which had exhausted their potential some years before the beginning of the
Ukraine crisis.
The fragmentary contacts between Brussels and Eurasian Economic Union
bodies represent a separate area, where Russian and EU interests intertwine. In the coming years
this multilateral cooperation project will stagnate, but the representatives of its executive body,
the Eurasian Economic Commission, are already involved in some issues concerning foreign economic
activities. These forms of dialogue will be both necessary and sufficient to achieve any goals
Russia and Europe may set beyond the outdated "trust and integration" paradigm.