Analytics
EUREN Brief 5
T
The EU, Russia and the Future of European
Security: Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in the Arctic
The Arctic has long been considered as an area
of low military tension with a potential for sub-regional cooperation, especially in jointly
developing energy resources in the High North. Receding polar ice, as a result of climate change,
has created even more opportunities in this respect. It also encourages more intensive use of the
Northern Sea Route (NSR), which is gradually opening up for navigation for ever bigger parts of the
year. However, the Arctic region is no longer exempt from broader geopolitical tensions. Recognising
these changes, some individual EU Member States (the UK, Netherlands, Germany) have recently
published white papers or other policy documents on Arctic security and the Finnish EU Presidency is
pushing for better coordination and possibly a renewed EU Arctic strategy. Although the risk of a
military conflict originating in the Arctic could still be considered relatively low, this would not
exclude military spillover effects from conflicts elsewhere or misunderstandings concerning
incidents at sea or in the air, with the potential for escalation. In this context, this paper looks
into options for conflict prevention and regional security cooperation in the Arctic, which the EU
and Russia could jointly undertake in a number of different, multilateral frameworks.
September 2019
A geopolitical risk assessment
A geopolitical confrontation in a scramble for
Arctic resources seems unlikely in the short term. Legal and partially overlapping claims by Arctic
states, especially on the extension of Exclusive Economic Zones, are still under review by the UN
Commission on the Law of the Seas and practical issues concerning deep water offshore exploration
basically remain unresolved, as long as the dual-use technology needed for such exploration and
exploitation remain subject to Western sanctions. Different legal issues on the interpretation of
the rights and obligations of coastal states and the rights of free passage and navigation are still
manageable, especially as long as NSR-shipping remains limited. The fact that Russia still seems to
be acting here as a status quo power and respecting international law, could pave the way for the
rebuilding of some trust, not only in furthering dialogue, but also in finding compromise solutions,
even when legal positions differ. A good example of this would be the recent settlement of the case
of the Greenpeace ship "Arctic Sunrise" between the Netherlands and the Russian Federation.[1]
Meanwhile, a certain "militarisation" of the Arctic region has taken place with several
powers, including Russia, either rebuilding military facilities or developing broader Arctic
military capabilities and extending their operational capabilities for border control. Military
exercises within the region could also lead to increased threat perceptions on both sides and to
miscommunication, misunderstandings and incidents, either at sea or in the air. Overall, the Russian
military build-up in the High North could still be considered as being mainly defensive, in view of
the serious degradation of military assets in the 1990s and the strategic importance of protecting
Russia's Nuclear Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) of the Northern Fleet, as implied in
its "Bastion Strategy".[2]
Furthermore, climate change leaves bigger parts of Russia's northern coastline exposed and in need
of not only military protection, but also better capabilities for border control, as other actors
(fishermen, poachers, smugglers, environmental activists, migrants) are gaining opportunities to
reach coastal areas that are no longer protected by the polar ice.
Although the risk of a military conflict
originating in the Arctic could still be considered relatively low, this would not exclude
military spillover effects from conflicts elsewhere or misunderstandings concerning incidents at
sea or in the air, with the potential for escalation
At the same time, Russian build-up of military
resources, and especially Anti-air/Area Denial assets, could pose a challenge for NATO's Sea Lines
of Communication and reinforcement operations in times of crisis. Svalbard, Iceland and the
Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap have regained strategic importance, which they had lost after the
Cold War ended. A special point of attention would also be the growing role of China in developing
its Polar Silk Road, which is still mainly of an economic nature, but could have broader security
consequences as well, depending on how China's partnership with Russia develops.[3]
Therefore, the biggest challenges at the moment seem to be:
The prevention of an escalation
or spillover of military conflicts elsewhere (the Baltic or Black Sea areas) to the Arctic by
identifying platforms for military-military contacts and for broader dialogue and cooperation on
hard security-related issues, including Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs);
Identification of possible areas for non-military security cooperation, including search and rescue
and possible ecological crises, while keeping options open for broader cooperation in the future.
Military-to-military dialogue and CSBMs:
limited role for the EU
Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict, military-to-military contacts between Russia and Western partners have been diminished and
other forms of security dialogue (NATO-Russia Council or within OSCE) have been stalling, including
on possible (regional) confidence and security building measures. The mandate of the
intergovernmental Arctic Council, which brings together Arctic and near-Arctic states and partners,
does explicitly not extend to military security affairs. However, such a platform could be found in
the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR). This Forum has been meeting since 2011, but
Russia has no longer been invited since 2014. Re-inviting Russia and prioritising dialogue on issues
like broader military transparency, prevention of incidents and managing local conflicts could be
useful steps in rebuilding trust and eventually adopting some military code of conduct for the High
North, as recently proposed by M.Boulègue.[4]
However, it seems that Russia would still prefer meetings of Chiefs of Defence Staff instead of
re-engaging in the ASFR.
In principle, Arctic security could also be discussed in the NATO-Russia
Council, but not all Arctic states are NATO members (especially Sweden and Finland) and
NATO member Denmark is hesitant to bring NATO more actively into the Arctic region, as the position
of Greenland remains a sensitive issue. In as far as the EU discusses such issues, this is
mostly done in close cooperation with NATO and non-EU member states, like Norway (and also the
post-Brexit UK in future). Selective engagement between the EU and Russia at present does not extend
to Arctic hard security issues and most recent discussion papers, both by the Commission's European
Political Strategy Centre [5]
and the College of Europe on strengthening EU engagement in the Arctic are hesitant in this respect.
The latter even suggests that "expressing security concerns may fan the flames".[6]
Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict, military-to-military contacts between Russia and Western partners have been diminished
and other forms of security dialogue (NATO-Russia Council or within OSCE) have been stalling
The OSCE could also be a platform, as
all Arctic states are also OSCE participating states, but there does not seem to be much support
among the participating states at present to move in that direction. However, considering the OSCE's
comprehensive security mandate, this could be a logical platform for inter-related hard and soft
security issues in a sub-regional context. B. Schaller has suggested that specific CSBMs for the
Arctic region could start to be developed, beginning with a systematic information exchange and
verification of military capabilities of Arctic states deployed in the region.[7]
Whether the OSCE could play this more inclusive role could be further investigated, including in the
context of the OSCE's Structured Dialogue. However, it should be noted that the EU, as such, plays
only a limited role inside the OSCE, apart from the EU Member States in their capacity of OSCE
participating states.
Broader security issues in the Arctic as
an option for EU-Russia cooperation
At the recent Arctic Forum in St Petersburg,
President Putin underlined Russia's willingness for cooperation with other partners in the Arctic.
As joint exploitation of energy resources in the Arctic remains closed for Western energy companies,
due to the present export restrictions on dual-use technologies and on the financing of such
projects under EU and US sanctions, such options for cooperation will have to be found in other
areas. In this context, some soft security issues, like emergency response, search and rescue and
cooperation on the protection of the fragile Arctic environment, could be a more realistic subject
of bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation, including between the EU and Russia. Both the Arctic
Council and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which will both be chaired by Russia in
the coming years, could be used as platforms for such dialogue and cooperation, including on
integrated marine management.[8]
And the OSCE, including the Economic and Environmental Dimension (EED), could also be
better used to foster interaction between all Arctic states and near-Arctic states (except for
China). The main issue here could well be convincing the US that such a multilateral approach could
serve its interests in the Arctic better than any unilateral "America First"-approach, as recently
outlined by Secretary of State Pompeo.[9]
As the EU's role within the OSCE is limited, the EU should also renew its efforts to
acquire observer status within the Arctic Council, which is presently blocked by Russia. Although
the EU, as such, already participates in all working groups, having formal observer status could
give it more opportunities, including for dialogue and cooperation in the Arctic with Russia,
especially when its integrated Arctic policy, adopted in 2016 [10],
would be renewed and strengthened under the new Commission.
EU and Russia could attempt to move forward
simultaneously in developing a more intensive dialogue and closer cooperation on non-military
security issues, including dealing with the broader consequences of climate change in the Arctic