Analytics
EUREN Chronicle 2:
The EU's and Russia's common neighbourhood:
shared or contested?
by Sabine Fischer
April 2017
The discussions during the meeting were shaped by important general perceptions and expectations on both sides.
Approach of the respective other to the neighbourhood
Russian participants saw the EU as expanding
its influence in the post-Soviet space without considering the consequences of its policy. Judging
from the statements of Russian participants, the EU is perceived as a geopolitical player who has
been consistently securitising its policy – to Russia's detriment and with negative implications for
the stability of the affected countries and the region as a whole. Moscow, on the other hand, was
seen by experts from EU member states as deliberately deepening the dependence of neighbouring
countries on Russia – including by applying military means where political and economic instruments
fail – in order to halt their re-orientation towards the West/the EU.
Each side strongly
rejected the intentions attributed to it by the respective other and stressed that such agendas were
"stellar years" away from their own self-perception. EU participants underlined that the European
Neighbourhood Policy/EaP aimed at gradual economic and political transformation of the associated
countries and their integration into the European market, but was and is not targeted against
Russia. Many speakers on the EU side also pointed to the manifold problems the EU faces, ranging
from internal crises undermining foreign policy instruments to a lack of strategy vis-à-vis Russia
and neighbouring countries, and unfavourable conditions for EU policy in the region.
EU participants underlined that the European
Neighbourhood Policy/EaP aimed at gradual economic and political transformation of the
associated countries and their integration into the European market, but was and is not targeted
against Russia
Russian participants rejected the notion of a systematic and aggressive Russian policy aimed at reintegrating the post-Soviet space. In their description, Moscow's approach was much less strategic, based on historical political, economic and societal ties between Russia and neighbouring countries, and in many ways defensive vis-à-vis the expansionist policies of the EU and other Western actors. A number of Russian participants also highlighted that the Russian political elite and foreign policy decision-making were much less homogeneous and monolithic than usually perceived in the EU as well as in neighbouring countries.
Stability as a major preference for future developments
Strikingly, participants from the EU and
Russia identified stability and stabilisation as the single most important goal for both sides'
policies towards the common neighbourhood. A consensus may be assumed, therefore, on the value of
stability as a basis for future developments in the region. There were, however, significant
discrepancies in how the experts (including from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) defined
stability/stabilisation.
For instance, speakers from both sides regularly stressed that the
"Ukraine scenario" must not be allowed to repeat itself in other countries in the future – but the
discussion also showed clearly that the term "Ukraine scenario" was subject to varying
interpretations. Russian participants mainly referred to the downfall of the Yanukovich regime,
which happened despite an international agreement on the transition of power and, in their eyes,
with strong Western support. Participants from EU Member States mainly spoke about the "Revolution
of Dignity" on the Maidan, and the subsequent developments in Crimea and the Donbas, including
Russia's role in them.
Generally speaking, stability/stabilisation meant less interference
by the EU and other Western actors in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries and the region
as a whole where Russian speakers were concerned. Statements by speakers from EU member states
pointed in the opposite direction. Interestingly there was a discussion among EU experts about the
extent to which stability/stabilisation as opposed to democracy and human rights have come to
determine the EU's approach towards the neighbourhood in recent years. One speaker pointed out that,
even though stability/ stabilisation now feature much more prominently in EU policy, the goal cannot
be authoritarian stabilisation but stable management of necessary political and economic change in
the countries concerned.
Russian participants mainly referred to the
downfall of the Yanukovich regime, which happened despite an international agreement on the
transition of power and, in their eyes, with strong Western support
The discussions revealed both overlaps in the assessment of political developments in some parts of the common neighbourhood and spaces for potential cooperation. However, cooperation is bound to be unsustainable or can even lead to new conflict and confrontation if the substantial differences in mutual perceptions and expectations on both sides are not taken into account and dealt with.
BELARUS
Participants from the EU and Russia assessed the situation in Belarus in very similar ways. EU speakers stressed the highly personalised system of rule in the country, which weakens political institutions and undermines good governance. It also makes external actors such as the EU (but also Russia) strongly dependent on President Lukashenka. Russian experts pointed to the thick fabric of the bilateral relationship between Russia and Belarus, which involves actors and institutions in the political, economic, societal and military spheres. They, too, emphasized the crucial role of the Belarussian president, however with a different twist. Moscow, they said, deliberately leaves Lukashenka with a certain margin of manoeuvre to expand relations with the EU so as to demonstrate that Russia recognises him as a sovereign leader. This, in turn, allows him to "take a lot" from Russia. There was agreement among participants on Belarus facing huge economic problems – which could in future lead to dangerous socio-economic tensions and political destabilisation.
Participants from all sides, including from
Belarus, identified the gradual transformation of the Belarussian economy as a potential area of
cooperation
One speaker cited recent protests across the country as an indication that such a risk is very real. This would in turn jeopardise Lukashenka's rule, which, as it turned out during the debate, in the medium term would be in the interest of neither Russia nor the EU. Participants from all sides, including from Belarus, identified the gradual transformation of the Belarussian economy as a potential area of cooperation. They also saw a number of obstacles in the way of such cooperation: Belarus and the EU would need to reduce mutual mistrust. One speaker pointed out that EU-Belarussian relations still lack a legal basis (i.e. a partnership and cooperation or other agreement). Russia would need to abstain from bailing out Belarus for political reasons and to start applying real conditionality – preferably in coordination with the IMF – to urge the Belarussian government to reform. Experts from both sides agreed that any kind of economic change in Belarus will come with risks of political destabilisation. The challenge for both the EU and Russia would be to not let the situation degenerate.
MOLDOVA
Similar to the case of Belarus, Russian and EU experts were very close in their assessment of the tumultuous political situation in Moldova. One speaker called the state of affairs an "oligarchic state capture financed by European tax payers". Support for European integration has been declining recently due to growing disappointment with the domestic situation and the EU association process, while pro-Russian sentiment in the population and elite is on the rise. One Russian participant stressed, however, that Russia's structural (economic and political) power in Moldova has been on a downward slope over a much longer period of time. In the current situation it is local actors with particularistic interests, who – in a "simulation of geopolitics" – exploit the conflict between Russia and the EU for their domestic power struggle.
One Russian participant stressed, however, that
Russia's structural (economic and political) power in Moldova has been on a downward slope over
a much longer period of time
Competition on the local and "geopolitical" level is bound to intensify in the run-up to the elections in 2018. As in Belarus, rising socio-economic tensions in Moldova proper, but also in Transnistria, heighten the risk of destabilisation. Were Russia and the EU to cooperate on Moldova, they should focus on this area.
UKRAINE
The discussion on Ukraine proved most
difficult and controversial. There was no common ground whatsoever on the status of Crimea and the
situation in the Donbas or on the origins of the current crisis.
Russian experts spoke about
preconditions for the implementation of the Minsk agreements, but insisted that Crimea would stay
with Russia. Speakers on the EU side stressed the complete breakdown of trust after Russia's
violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. One speaker warned that narratives in
the EU, Ukraine and Russia were drifting apart rapidly, thereby driving the elites and the societies
further away from one another and blending into the general trend towards disengagement and
isolation.
There was general agreement, including among Russian experts, that the crisis and
the war had transformed Ukraine from a "swing state" between Russia and the EU into a country with
an unequivocally pro-European orientation, and consolidated the identity of Ukrainian society
against Russia. Ukraine is now clearly moving towards European integration. It is, however,
confronted with an EU that risks losing its own sense of direction. This might undermine
pro-European attitudes and – should this trend continue – might leave Ukrainian society in a vacuum
because it has "lost" the Russian alternative/counterweight.
Russian experts spoke about preconditions for the
implementation of the Minsk agreements, but insisted that Crimea would stay with Russia