Analytics
EUREN Chronicle 1:
The relationship between the EU, Russia, and the
US
by Sabine Fischer
February 2017
New US administration and its policies
Much of the debate about the political
relationship between the EU, Russia and the US focused on expectations with regard to the new US
administration. While participants from Russia, EU Member States and the US differed in their
assessments of the new US president, they were united in their uncertainty about his future
policies.
Russian participants stressed Donald Trump's declared foreign policy goals to
constrain China and fight Islamic terrorism, both of which they considered a potential window of
opportunity for Russia. In his strive to prevent China from growing ever more powerful, President
Trump would try to vow Russia away from too close a Russian-Chinese alliance. This could strengthen
Russia's relative weight visà-vis the US. The fact that European security seems to be of secondary
importance for the new US President takes away a key bone of contention between the US and Russia.
President Trump, in this reading, poses a serious challenge to the cohesion of the West – but
provides at least some opportunities for Russia.
At the same time, Russian participants made
it clear that major contentious issues remain unsolved. Russia has no interest whatsoever to become
a junior partner of either the US or China.
Russian participants stressed Donald Trump's
declared foreign policy goals to constrain China and fight Islamic terrorism, both of which they
considered a potential window of opportunity for Russia
Military tensions with the US prevail with no
solution in sight. Moscow and Washington continue to nurture diverging narratives about the causes
of and responsibility for the current crisis. Therefore, even though some potential for an
improvement of the relationship seems to exist, its realization has yet to come to pass.
Participants
from EU Member States saw continuity between the Obama and the Trump administration in so far as
European and transatlantic security is no longer a strategic priority for the US. However, while the
Obama administration consistently stressed the importance of a strong and cohesive Europe, President
Trump's statements point exactly in the opposite direction. One participant expressed the hope that
this could have a uniting effect on the EU. EU and US participants stressed potential pitfalls,
which could prevent a US-Russian "honeymoon". For instance, a more assertive US policy towards China
could put Russia in a complicated position given its own efforts to intensify partnership with its
Eastern neighbour. The policies of the new US administration on some other issues, including on
Iran, the JCPOA and post-conflict developments in Syria, could contradict both Russian and EU
interests.
Security cooperation: Danger of a new arms race
During the discussion on security cooperation
speakers emphasized the imminent danger of a new arms race. While this concern was shared on all
sides, the discussion brought to light different positions. It was pointed out by one EU
participant, that the EU has a very small part to play in this area and, with the exception of
France and the UK, has to "watch and pray" that current tensions not spiral out of control.
US/NATO
missile defense plans remain a major contentious issue. Russian experts emphasized that Russia does
not consider the system envisaged by the US defensive. It will, therefore, continue to be a source
of mistrust on the Russian side. Given the imbalance in military capabilities and high technology,
one Russian participant said, Russia will do anything to catch up with the US. Interestingly it was
pointed out several times by different sides that the meaning of certain aspects of missile defense
seems to have changed. The Polish MD site, for instance, lost relative importance to the rotating
NATO battalions in eastern Poland in the overall context of US-Polish defense cooperation. A Russian
participant pointed out that in case President Trump truly wanted to focus MD on homeland
protection, this could be a starting point for discussion.
NATO policy, it was stressed by speakers from the
EU/US, would be shaped mainly by the development of Russian policy
Western participants stressed how Russia had come to be seen again as a major threat over the past few years. This is especially true for the US, and it served, among other things, as a trigger for new weapons programmes. It also puts NATO in a difficult position, having to walk a very thin line between deterrence, on the one hand, and the need to maintain dialogue and search for "islands of cooperation" with Russia, on the other – a schizophrenic situation, as one participant put it. NATO policy, it was stressed by speakers from the EU/US, would be shaped mainly by the development of Russian policy.
Syria, the situation in the Middle East and the
international fight against terrorism, were seen as potential fields of cooperation
Tactical nuclear weapons were another pressing
issue on which positions diverged quite fundamentally. Russian experts explained that this group of
weapons is considered in Russia as the only means of regional deterrence – and therefore
non-negotiable in a situation of strong international tension. US speakers countered that, not least
because of certain actions and threats from Russia, many in the US believe that Russia had a first
use approach towards non-strategic nuclear weapons. Participants were equally pessimistic about
progress on conventional arms control in the current negative atmosphere.
Syria, the
situation in the Middle East and the international fight against terrorism, were seen as potential
fields of cooperation. However, participants also questioned the sides' capability to develop such
cooperation beyond mere lip service. Russia's return as a strategic player in the Middle East
changes the regional setting, which now entails two lose coalitions with the US and the Gulf Arab
States on one side, and Russia, Turkey and Iran, on the other. If not contained, these new
geopolitical fault lines could lead to new and dangerous eruptions in the future. Furthermore, it
was criticized that there is little strategic thinking about the desirable post-conflict political
development of Syria. As one participant put it, "bombing jointly" may be a victory for cooperation,
but it may lead to future conflict if there is no vision for the post-war situation. In this context
some participants questioned Russia's ability to prove itself as a leader in the Middle East (not
only militarily, but also politically and economically), if the US were to altogether withdraw from
the region.
The impact of Western sanctions on Russia
The discussion on sanctions focused on the
impact of Western sanctions on Russia while there was very little reflection on Russian counter
sanctions. It was emphasized by EU and US participants that their goal was not "to destroy Russia",
but to protest against Russian illegal policies and to help protect the European security order.
While assessments on their overall impact on the Russian economy differed, some participants listed
a number of unintended consequences. For instance, it was pointed out that the sanctions had hit
Russian small and medium size enterprises particularly heavily. This would be difficult to repair
even if sanctions were lifted. It was also assumed that, because of the loss of mutual trust, the
mere absence of the sanctions at some point in the future would not suffice to restore economic
relations. It was pointed out that the EU/the US lacked clear criteria for the efficiency of
sanctions.
In conjunction with the Russian leadership's stronger reliance on a protectionist
economic policy since 2014 sanctions also helped create a new group of stakeholders inside the
Russian economy. Those actors display strong interest in the preservation of sanctions and the
continuation of the current crisis in political and economic relations between Russia and the West.
Some Russian participants criticized the lack of flexibility of the Western sanctions
approach. The Ukrainian government was accused of not being interested in the implementation of the
Minsk agreements but rather in the continuation of the conflict in order to maintain the sanctions
against Russia.
It was emphasized by EU and US participants that
their goal was not "to destroy Russia", but to protest against Russian illegal policies and to
help protect the European security order
Participants also questioned the West's ability to keep up a coordinated sanctions policy. There was consensus that a collapse of the sanctions would be more problematic for the EU than for the US. It was also emphasized that sanctions alone do not substitute for a Russia policy or strategy. With transatlantic cooperation weakening, however, it may become even more difficult to conceive an efficient strategy for relations with Russia.
Recommendations
Most recommendations were formulated in regard
to security cooperation:
- Given the bleak prospects for strategic, tactical and
conventional arms control participants across the spectrum agreed that the sides should focus on
"secondary issues" like mil-to-mil contacts, confidence building measures etc. While practical
cooperation between NATO and Russia will most likely remain suspended, such a policy of small steps
could aim at risk reduction.
- Most participants also agreed upon the necessity to cooperate
on the Middle East. Iran should not be contained as an enemy, one speaker pointed out, but
considered an important (if controversial) regional actor. The sides should take this as a starting
point to develop a minimalist agenda for cooperation including the prevention of a "cold war"
between Saudia Arabia and Iran, the preservation of the JCPOA and more strategic reflection on a
nuclear-free zone in the Gulf for the post-JCPOA implementation period.
Some Russian participants criticized the lack of
flexibility of the Western sanctions approach